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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN J. VANLEEUWEN,
No. 940586 CA
Claimant/Petitioner,
Priority No. 7
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
CUSTOM LANDSCAPE SERVICES, and
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/Respondents•
Argument
I.

Utah's "Going and Coming" Rule Specifically Excludes
Claimant from Its Provisions
The Claimant in this case is entitled to worker's

compensation benefits.

The "going and coming" rule, as refined

by the Utah courts is not a bar to these benefits.

The Utah

version of the "going and coming" rule is narrow and specific in
its application.
As a general rule, an employee
within the course of his employment
compensation purposes when he [(1)]
transportation and [(2)] is injured
his place of employment.

is not deemed to be
for workmen's
furnishes his own
while going to or from

Higgins v. Industrial Comm'n, 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985)
(emphasis added).

The present appeal is very simple. The

Claimant was using an employer-provided vehicle, not his own.
Under the terms of the Higgins rule, the Claimant is entitled to
worker's compensation benefits.

In light of this simple rule, it

is somewhat difficult to understand Respondent's remark that

1

"[t]his is simply an incorrect statement of the law."
Respondent's Brief, p. 9.

Notwithstanding Higgins, Respondent

seeks to rely upon Utah State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n,
685 P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) •
A review of Utah State Tax Comm'n, however, reveals that the
Court never quite recited the "going and coming" rule.

Instead,

the Court states:
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to
protect employees who sustain injuries arising out of their
employment by affording financial security during the
resulting period of disability. To give effect to that
purpose, the Act should be liberally construed and applied
to provide coverage. Any doubt respecting the right of
compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured
employee.
The Act provides that every employee who is injured in
an accident "arising out of [and] in the course of his
employment wheresoever such injury occurred" shall be
compensated for resulting losses. From that rule of blanket
coverage, courts have fashioned an exception, sometimes
known as the "coming and going rule," which denies
compensation for injuries suffered on the way to and from
work. Whether or not the injury arises out of or within the
scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of
each case. The injury has been held compensable where
transportation was furnished by the employer to the benefit
of the employer; where the employer requires the employee to
use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the business; where
the employee is injured while upon a "special errand" or
"special mission" for the employer; where ingress and egress
at place of employment are inherently dangerous; and where
the employee combined pleasure and business on a trip, and
the business part predominated.
State Tax Comm'n/ 685 P.2d at 1053 (emphasis added).

The court

recognized the rule of blanket coverage and the liberal
construction to be given to the Act, stated the existence of the
"going and coming" rule, described its effect, and enumerated a
number of exceptions to the "going and coming" rule. Not until
2

the following year, in Higgins, did the Utah Supreme Court
explicitly state the present Utah "going and coming" rule.
The rule of Higgins has recently been explicitly quoted by
this Court.

In Cross v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n,

824 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of
Appeals quoted the rule from Higgins and characterized it as
"[t]he well established rule."

Notably, the Court, after quoting

Higgins's language, also cited Cherne Constr. v. Posso, 735 P.2d
384 (Utah 1987), State Tax Comm'n, Barney v. Industrial Comm'n,
506 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1973), and Bailey v. Utah State Indus.
Comm'n, 398 P.2d 545 (Utah 1965), all as support for the rule of
Higgins.
The rule in Higgins requires, that to deny worker's
compensation benefits under the "going and coming" rule, the
Claimant must have been injured while driving his own vehicle to
or from work.

In Higgins/ Cherne, and Cross the reviewing court

found that there was no reason to deviate from the "going and
coming" rule because the Claimant was injured driving his own
vehicle.

In State Tax Comm'n, Bailey, and Barney, the court

found that, for various reasons, the "going and coming" rule was
inapplicable.
In the present case, the Higgins rule is determinative.

The

Claimant was not driving his own vehicle, rather he was driving
the Employer's vehicle.
Claimant's compensation.

The vehicle was provided as part of the
R. at 30-31.

The Employer limited the

use of the vehicle and paid for the maintenance.
3

R. at 17-18,

30-31.

Finally, the Employer paid for the fuel, including fuel

consumed during the commute to work.

R. at 18. The rule of

blanket coverage should be applied to this case and the Claimant
should be awarded worker's compensation benefits.

II.

Employer Had Control Over the Petitioner's Use of the
Vehicle and Received a Benefit from the Arrangement
In the present case, the Employer expressly limited the

Petitioner's use of the vehicle in question.

The record

demonstrates that the Employer instructed the Petitioner that the
vehicle was for business use only and forbade personal use of the
vehicle.

R. at 16, 34-35.

The Employer further testified that,

while stopping on the way home from work for dinner may not be an
item of significant concern itself, there was concern because the
line between business and personal use was vague and the Employer
wanted the truck used specifically and only for business use.
at 34-35.

The Employer pointedly stated that using the vehicle

for a personal trip to Park City would be unacceptable.
34.

R.

R. at

These controls and limits on the Claimant's right to use the

vehicle were established by the Employer and communicated to the
Claimant.

R. at 30-31, 34.

In the face of this testimony, the Employer now flatly
suggests that while "it had the 'right to control' [Claimant]
while he was engaged in his employment[,] [t]hat right to control
did not extend to time spent in transit to and from work."
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This contention is inconsistent with
the testimony presented by the Employer at the hearing of the
4

matter.

R. at 30-31, 34 (forbidding all personal use of the

vehicle).

At the hearing, the Employer stated that deviations

from the prescribed use of the vehicle were intolerable.

Id.

The Employer reserved the right to control the Claimant in his
use of the vehicle at all times and to limit the use of the
vehicle.

It is the right to control, not the actual exercise of

control that is the critical element.

Pinter Constr. Co. v.

Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1984). Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d
820, 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, since the Employer explicitly forbade personal use
of the vehicle, only business use was allowed.

The Employer

evidently included commuting to work within its definition of
business use.

In addition, the Employer clearly expected the

Claimant to bring the vehicle to work each day as it was required
for the daily work projects.

The Employer acknowledged that the

vehicle was safer at the Claimant's home than at the Employer's
office.

R. at 35.x

Additionally, the vehicle was a vital part

1. Respondent claims there was never any evidence of
vandalism at the Employer's premises. The Claimant's supervisor
actually testified, under questioning from his own attorney:
Q:

All right. With respect to any vandalism, did you ever
have a problem with vandalism when you kept the trucks
down there at the Triad Center?

A:

Nothing to any big extent. There would be, like he
[Claimant] said, the transients would come in and sleep
in them and things like that. But any big vandalism,
no.

R. at 32-33. Under questioning from the Claimant's attorney, the
supervisor testified:
Q:

Was there any thought in your mind about the vandalism
5

of the equipment necessary to complete the day's work.
23-24,

R. at 12,

It had to be driven to the Employer's workplace; the

Claimant had no choice.

R. at 9-10, 12, 16, 23-24.

The Employer states, in its brief:
[Claimant] was given the option to use the company truck for
his commute. This courtesy was merely offered to the
employee as a benefit in lieu of a raise in pay. The
employee could have chosen to reject or accept this benefit
and still maintain his position of employment.
Respondent's Brief, p. 16-17 (emphasis added).

Curiously,

Respondent fails to provide a citation to the record in support
of the underlined sentence.

The reason no citation is provided

is because there is no evidence in the record to support the
assertion.
The Employer stated that providing the vehicle to the
Claimant was to be a "benefit" to the Claimant and was in lieu of
higher wages. R. at 30-31, 34-35.

The Employer received a

significant and substantial benefit from this arrangement.

The

Employer performed, or paid the Claimant to perform, maintenance
on the vehicle at its shop.

R. at 17-18.

The Employer, rather

than the Claimant, paid the expenses of fuel for the vehicle,
including fuel for the Claimant's journey from home to work.

Id.

when you had Mr. Vanleeuwen take the truck home?
A:

As we was [sic] discussing the benefit as far as his
raise increase and the fact that he was a full-time
foreman and everything, we were talking about the
truck, it was a new truck, we were just picking it up.
And we says [sic], you know, it probably would be safer
at your [Claimant's] home than parked down here, you
know, you never know. So there could have been, yes.

R. at 34-35.
6

A valuable managerial employee was secured for a lower payroll
cost.

R. at 30-31, 34-35.

The vehicle was safeguarded at all

hours and the Employer felt the vehicle was safer.

R. at 35.

These actions of the Employer demonstrate the importance the
Employer attached to the journey and the benefit it gave to the
Employer.
Under the "going and coming" rule, Utah courts have been
directed to consider both the benefit the Employer receives as
well as the Employer's right to control the Claimant. Whitehead
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989).

In

the present case, the Employer had exclusive control over the
Claimant's use of the vehicle; the Claimant had no independent
right to use the vehicle in any other manner than what the
Employer proscribed.

Moreover, the Employer benefitted

substantially from this arrangement.

Given the benefit to the

Employer and the Employer's control of the use of the vehicle,
worker's compensation benefits should be awarded to the Claimant
in this case.

III. The Employer-Conveyance Doctrine Is Applicable
Professor Larson identifies, inter alia two separate
exceptions to the "going and coming" rule applicable to this
case.

The first is where the journey to work is a part of the

employment.

The second is known as the employer conveyance rule.

"In the majority of cases involving a deliberate and
substantial payment for the expense of travel, or the provision
7

of an automobile under the employee's control/ the journey is
held to be in the course of employment."
COMPENSATION,

Arthur Larson, WORKMEN'S

§ 16.31 (1991) (emphasis added).

Larson then cites a

number of supporting cases.2 Larson notes that the basis for
this rule "depends upon the relative importance of travel as part
of the service performed; the supplying of cash or cars is
evidence of the status of the journey as part of the compensated
employment."

Id. at § 17.10.

Thus, in the present case, the

Employer provided the vehicle as well as the fuel, R. at 18; the
vehicle was provided pursuant to an express agreement between the
Claimant and the Employer regarding Claimant's wages, R. at 30-

2. Professor Larson cites a Utah case in support of this
proposition, Hafer's Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 526 P.2d 1188
(Utah 1974). In Hafer's, the Employer provided the Claimant with
a vehicle to use. The Claimant was a traveling salesman. In
preparation for a sales trip the next day, the Claimant took the
car to a service station to be checked. The car was placed on
the rack and while the Claimant himself was attempting to work on
the car, a spring-load shock absorber came loose, struck the
Claimant in the head, resulting in a claim. The Employer sought
to disavow coverage, arguing that the Claimant was beyond the
scope of his employment in working on the car. In rejecting this
contention, the Court stated:
It is to be conceded, as the plaintiff contends, that doing
mechanical work on an automobile is not normally regarded as
part of the duties of a salesman. Nevertheless, the scope
of one's employment includes not only those things which are
the direct and primary duties of the assigned job; but also
those things which are reasonably necessary and incidental
thereto.
Id. at 1189. On this basis the Court upheld an award of
benefits. In the present case, the Claimant was involved in
activities which were reasonably necessary and incidental, and in
fact the subject of explicit agreement between the Claimant and
the Employer. He was traveling to work in the Employer's
vehicle, which had been provided in lieu of higher wages.
8

31; and the Employer limited and controlled the Claimant's use of
the vehicle, R. at 34-35.

Accordingly, the journey to work

became a part of the compensated employment of the Claimant.
The employer-conveyance exception leads to the same result.
Larson states M[w]hen the journey to or from work is made in the
employer's conveyance, the journey is in the course of
employment, the reason being that the risks of employment
continue throughout the journey."

.Id. at § 17.00.

The rationale

for this rule is that the Employer has, by his own choice,
expanded the scope of employment under his control.

In the

present case, the Employer has carefully limited the Claimant's
use of the vehicle.

The Employer has carefully maintained

control over the Claimant's activities while using the vehicle
and thereby expanded the scope of employment.

This was done for

the Employer's own benefit: to retain a valuable managerial
employee for a lower cost.
Under either rule, the result in the present case is
identical.

The vehicle was provided pursuant to an express

agreement.

The Employer maintained control of the vehicle and

instructed the Claimant regarding permissible uses of the
vehicle.

The Employer, for its own purpose, provided a

conveyance to the Claimant and therefore, the Claimant should be
awarded benefits under the Act.

IV.

Case Law From Sister States

9

The Respondent makes much of distinguishing facts of each
case from Utah's sister states. However, the Employer seems
curiously unwilling to discuss the legal rules established by
these cases. The Employer treats each cited case as a fixed
point, having no vector or velocity,

it is important to

understand the rule of law established in each case in addition
to the peculiar facts of each case.
In Hansen v. Estate of Harvey, 806 P.2d 450 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990), two employees were injured when the vehicle in which they
were riding overturned,
driving the vehicle.

id. at 450-51.

Neither employee was

The employees collected worker's

compensation benefits in Washington, where the accident occurred,
and then attempted to sue their employer in tort in Idaho.

Id.

at 451. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that the employees could
not sue in tort because of the exclusive remedy provision of the
Worker's Compensation Act. Id. at 452.

In reaching this

conclusion, the Court stated:
Generally speaking, an accident is deemed not to be in the
course of employment if it occurs while the employee is on
his way to work and has not yet reached the employer's
premises, or while the employee is on his way home and has
left the employer's premises. . . • [An exception to this
rule exists] when the employee is "going and returning in
some transportation facility furnished by the employer."
Id. at 451-52.

The Idaho Court of Appeals then noted that the

"sole material fact" was whether the Claimants were "riding in
employer-provided transportation."
appeal is no different.

Id. at 452. The present

The Claimant was riding in an employer

provided vehicle when he was injured.
10

Significantly, the Idaho

Supreme Court affirmed the Idaho Court of Appeals decision, and
noted that it represented the majority approach.
Estate of Harvey, 806 P.2d 426, 431 (Idaho 1990).

Hansen v.
The Idaho

Supreme Court also noted that providing compensation for injuries
sustained while within an employer-provided vehicle furthers the
underlying goals of the worker's compensation system of
M

constru[ing the act] liberally in favor of worker's compensation

coverage of claimants."

Id. at 431.

The Colorado Supreme Court has also recognized a similar
rule.

"[I]f an employer provides transportation to its employee

or pays the employee's cost of commuting to and from work, then
the scope of employment broadens to include the employee's
transportation."

Maryland Cas. Co. v. Messina, 874 P.2d 1058,

1063 (Colo. 1994), citing Loffland Bros, v. Baca, 651 P.2d 431
(Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
case.

This rule is applicable to the present

The Employer and the Claimant reached an agreement that

the vehicle would be provided in lieu of higher wages. The
Employer paid for all maintenance and provided the Claimant with
a credit card to purchase fuel, including the fuel consumed
during the commute to work.

The scope of employment thus

broadened and benefits should be awarded for the injuries
sustained by the Claimant.
The rationale for this rule is simple: the Employer has
exercised dominion over the trip and has demonstrated that the
commute is something in which he desires to be involved.
present case is illustrative.

The

The Employer wished to retain the
11

Claimant as an employee at a lower payroll cost.

The Employer

accomplished this goal by providing a non-payroll benefit, i.e.,
a vehicle and fuel, to the Claimant for the purpose of travel to
and from work.

To say that the Employer received no benefit from

this arrangement simply begs the question why the Employer would
provide the vehicle and pay the fuel costs for the Claimant.
also ignores the facts of the case.

It

The Employer benefitted by

gaining and maintaining control over the Claimant's commute and
by retaining the Claimant's service for a lower payroll expense.

V.

Petitioner Has Not Failed To Marshall the Evidence
Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to marshall the

evidence in this appeal.

Respondent states "Petitioner is

directly contending that the ALJ's factual determination that the
employer did not benefit from Vanleeuwen's use of the truck and
did not have control over the vehicle at the time of the
accident."

Respondent's Brief, p. 7. A review of the ALJ's

findings of fact, which were prepared by Respondent's counsel and
evidently not submitted to Petitioner's prior counsel, reveals
that no such factual findings were made.3
3.
Additionally, much of Respondent's complaint stems from
the inadequacies in the Findings of Fact, which Respondent
produced. The Findings of Fact hopelessly confuse factual
findings and legal conclusions. See Note 1, in Petitioner's
Brief-in-Chief. The document fails to set forth adequate
subsidiary facts to demonstrate the true basis for the ALJ's
decision. A review of the document prepared does not allow the
reader to determine how subsidiary facts support and compel
ultimate factual findings. See, Commercial Carriers v.
Industrial Comm'n, 888 P.2d 707, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Moreover, it is the peculiar structure of the Findings of
12

Paragraph 3 of the Findings provides:
The Court finds that the Applicant was not under the control
or supervision of the Defendants at the time of the accident
and, in fact even if he had been, deviated from such actions
by violating the traffic control device.
ALJ Order, attached as Exhibit B to Petitioner's Brief-in-Chief.
There is no dispute that Petitioner was driving the vehicle, and
was alone, at the time of the accident.
physical control of the vehicle.

No one else was in

However, the question of

whether a right to control exists, or of legal control, is a
question of law not a question of fact. Moreover, the issue to
be resolved is a question of law: was the Claimant within the
course of his employment when the accident occurred?
It is difficult to understand the Respondent's complaint
regarding the "considerable time and expense" to which it has
been put because of the alleged failure to marshall the evidence.
Respondent's Brief, p. 7.

The entire record on appeal is a

hearing transcript of 49 pages, the Findings of Fact prepared by
Respondent, and the Industrial Commission's two page order.
There are several orders of magnitude of difference between the
brief administrative record in the present case ( and the
voluminous record ordinarily produced in trial litigation.

Fact which cause this confusion. The Respondent first set forth
a five page summary of hearing testimony, and then set forth
"findings of fact." The findings of fact are flawed and the
actual subsidiary facts are presented in a queer manner.
However, these facts are not challenged. It is the legal
conclusion, that the Claimant was not within the course of
employment, that is challenged here.
13

The Respondent's complaint regarding marshalling of the evidence
is therefore misplace and disingenuous.

VI*

The Respondent's Parade of Horribles Does Not Exist
Finally, the Respondent raises the specter that awarding

benefits to the Claimant will destroy the worker's compensation
system.

The Respondent argues facts that were neither present in

the record nor presented to the lower finders of fact:
If the employee is deemed to be in the course of employment
merely because a car is furnished, regardless of the fact
that no control is retained and no benefit is received by
the employer, two things will occur. First, workers
compensation will move one step closer be forcing employers
to become a general insurer of all its employees from any
injuries they receive regardless of when they occur.
Second, small businesses, such as Custom Landscape, which
cannot afford to give higher pay will abstain from providing
other "perks" in lieu of pay raises. This will serve only
to hurt both employers and employees.
Make no mistake, but that Petitioner is seeking a
definite expansion to the existing worker's compensation
system. Such an expansion is solely the province of the
legislature, and should accordingly be left to that branch
of the government.
Respondent's Brief, p. 30. This passage presents facts that are
contradicted by the record.

As pointed out above, the Employer

did retain control over the use of the vehicle.

The Employer

communicated plain and clear limits on its use and so testified
at the hearing.

The Employer received a benefit from this

arrangement.
The suggestion that requiring Employers to provide workers
compensation coverage for injuries sustained in the course of
14

employment forces Employers to become their employees' general
insurer is ludicrous.

The Employer testified that the Claimant

might have used the vehicle in a manner beyond the scope of
employment, such as consuming alcohol in the vehicle or taking it
to Park City.

Injuries occurring as a result of such acts would

clearly be without worker's compensation coverage.

This is not a

case about a slipping in one's bath tub and blaming the employer.
It concerns a close and substantial nexus between the injury and
the employment; a nexus close enough to justify coverage.
Furthermore, to suggest that requiring coverage of such
incidents will drive small businesses out of business is also
wrong.

There is no evidence of Custom Landscape's size or

economic condition; Respondent is simply arguing facts not in the
record.

This argument is misplaced.

A judicial decision is

based upon the facts of the case and judicial precedent not
unsupported supposition.
Finally, Respondent suggests that this case represents a
concerted and radical expansion of the worker's compensation
system which the courts are unfit to do.

This case is not about

expanding the worker's compensation system.

This case concerns a

determination that a particular employer's method of compensating
his employees implicates the workers compensation coverage.

The

question presented by this case is whether an injury sustained by
an employee while operating an employer-provided car pursuant to
an agreement with the employer is within the scope of employment
and gives rise to worker's compensation benefits.
15

Conclusion
The Employer and the Claimant reached an agreement•

The

Employer would provide a car in lieu of higher wages and pay for
its maintenance and fuel.

The Claimant could use the car for the

commute to work, but was not to use it for personal use. The
commute to work was therefore considered by the parties to be
"business use."

The Claimant was using the vehicle for the

agreed purpose, at the proper place. Workers compensation
benefits should be awarded to the Claimant for his injuries.
DATED this 21st day of April, 1995.

Brad C. Smith, Attorney for
Claimant
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